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Insurance
by Stephen L. Cotter*
Stephen Schatz**
and Bradley S. Wolff**

I.

INTRODUCTION

No dramatic reversal of direction or case of first impression occurred
this survey period.' Rather, the courts continued to clarify and refine
the fine lines of Georgia insurance law. Multiple opinions help carriers
to better handle time-limit demands and to effectively reserve rights to
known coverage issues. After decades of confusing opinions, it was
finally made crystal-clear that an "occurrence" can exist where the
damage is to the insured's work. The Great Recession brought Georgia
an abundance of insurance rulings related to the risks encountered by
financial institutions.

* Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1974). Member, Mercer Law Review (1973-1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia;
American Bar Association; Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; Defense Research
Institute; International Association of Defense Counsel.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Virginia (B.A., with distinction, 1985); University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law (J.D., 1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Tort and Insurance
Practice and Litigation); Defense Research Institute.
*** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Defense Research Institute.
1. For an analysis of Georgia insurance law during the prior survey period, see Dean
A. Calloway, Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 135 (2013).
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AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Bad Faith
It has long been the established law in Georgia that an insurer may
be liable for an excess judgment against its insured if the insurer acted
in bad faith or was negligent in its refusal to settle a personal injury
claim within the policy limits.2 In Southern General Insurance Co. v.
Holt,' the Georgia Supreme Court held that an insurer could be liable
for bad faith where it failed to respond to a time-limited demand for
policy limits when "the company has knowledge of clear liability and
special damages exceeding the policy limits."4
Whether an insurer can be held liable for the failure to settle a claim
when the special damages are less than the policy limits had not been
specifically answered until a decision from the Georgia Court of Appeals
during this survey period.5 In Baker v. Huff Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co.,6 the court rejected an insurer's argument that it was entitled to
summary judgment on a bad faith claim because the injured party's
special damages were approximately one-third of the policy limits.' The
court, interpreting Holt and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Brightman,8 held that those cases "cannot be construed as holding that
it is always reasonable for an insurer not to respond to a time-limited
offer to settle within the policy limits when special damages do not
Rather, the true test is "whether the
exceed the policy limits."
in responding to a settlement
reasonably
acted
company
insurance
10
offer."
However, the court held that the insurance company was nevertheless
entitled to summary judgment.1' The court held that the first demand
the insurer received failed to provide sufficient information to compel a
reasonably prudent insurer to conclude the value of the case equaled or
exceeded the policy limits.12 Additionally, it determined the insurer

A.

2. E.g., Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, 684, 580 S.E.2d 519,
521 (2003); S. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268, 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992).
3. 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).
4. Id. at 269, 580 S.E.2d at 276.
5. Baker v. HuffLiberty Mut. Ins. Co., 323 Ga. App. 357,364,747 S.E.2d 1, 6-7 (2013).
6. 323 Ga. App. 357, 747 S.E.2d 1 (2013).
7. Id. at 364-65, 747 S.E.2d at 6-7.
8. 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519 (2003).
9. Baker, 323 Ga. App. at 364-65, 747 S.E.2d at 7.
10. Id. at 364, 747 S.E.2d at 7 (quoting Brightman,276 Ga. at 685, 580 S.E.2d at 521).
11. Id. at 365-66, 747 S.E.2d at 8.
12. Id. at 360, 365, 747 S.E.2d at 4, 7-8.
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was prevented from fully investigating the claim due to the claimant's
attorney's revocation of a medical-records release and refusal to allow his
client to be interviewed.13 Additional medical information and bills
were later provided by the claimant's attorney with a second timelimited demand for the policy limits. 4 But, within the time for
responding to that demand, the attorney sent another letter stating that
the claimant was "willing to accept $100,000 to compensate him for his
pain and suffering only." 5 This offer, the court held, was not an offer
to fully settle a claim within the policy limits, and therefore, the insurer
had no duty "to engage in negotiations concerning a settlement demand
that is in excess of the insurance policy's limits." 6
In Tiller v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,17 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
third-party claimants lacked standing to sue State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm) when directly asserting claims
for fraud and bad faith arising out of State Farm's use of the so-called
17c formula for computing diminished value claims."8 The court held
that the proposed class action plaintiffs were precluded from their direct
action by the general rule that "a party not in privity of contract may
not bring a direct action suit against the liability insurer of the party
alleged to have caused damage absent an unsatisfied judgment against
the insured, legislative mandate, or as permitted by a provision in the
insurance policy in issue," which requires that the plaintiff obtain a
judgment against the at-fault driver before proceeding against the
insurer.19 Related litigation pends in Georgia courts.
B.

Hospital Liens

Following the Georgia Supreme Court's 2011 decision in MCG Health,
Inc. v. Owners Insurance Co.,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals held in
MCG Health, Inc. v. Kight21 that a hospital is entitled to a lien for the
full amount of its billed charges even where it has been paid-by a
patient's health insurer-all that the hospital is entitled to be paid under

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
S.E.2d
20.
21.

Id. at 366, 747 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 366-67, 747 S.E.2d at 8-9.
Id. at 365, 747 S.E.2d at 7.
Id. (quoting Brightman, 276 Ga. at 687, 580 S.E.2d at 522).
549 F. App'x 849 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 853.
Id. (quoting Richards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Ga. App. 45, 45, 555
506, 507 (2001)).
288 Ga. 782, 707 S.E.2d 349 (2011).
325 Ga. App. 349, 750 S.E.2d 813 (2013).
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its contract with that insurer.2 2 Kight had health insurance with Blue
Cross, and the insurance company's contract with the hospital provided
for the payment of reduced rates for services and the hospital's
agreement not to bill insured patients for the difference between the
billed amount and the agreed reduced rate. Thus, when Blue Cross (and
the tortfeasor's carrier under a medical-payments coverage) paid the
hospital the agreed-upon amount for Kight's treatment, there was no
debt owed to the hospital. The hospital nevertheless filed a lien for the
amount of its original charges. When Kight received a settlement offer
from the tortfeasor, he demanded the hospital cancel its lien. The
hospital refused, and Kight brought suit to have the lien declared void
23
and cancelled. The trial court granted Kight summary judgment.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that since Kight was entitled
to collect the full amount of his medical bills from the tortfeasor, and
2
section 44-14-470 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) '
gave the hospital a lien on Kight's cause of action for the reasonable
charges incurred in the treatment, the hospital's lien was valid for the
amount of its reasonable charges billed but unpaid because of the
contractual discount.25 The court held:
The absence of debt owed to the Hospital under the contract with Blue
Cross, and the Hospital's agreement in the contract not to balance-bill
Blue Cross members to collect the difference between the reduced
charges and the billed charges, cannot be construed as a waiver or
preclusion of the Hospital's lien rights under [the statute] .26
In Hospital Authority of Clarke County v. Geico General Insurance
Co.,27 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations
for a medical provider's action to foreclose on its lien under O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-473(a?2 begins to run upon the occurrence of the last event
enumerated in the statute, not the first.29 Thus, where a settlement
agreement was reached and later finalized by the execution of a release,
the hospital's action to recover on its lien was held to be timely, although

22. Id. at 354, 750 S.E.2d at 817-18.
23. Id. at 349-52, 750 S.E.2d at 814-16.
24. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470 (2002 & Supp. 2014).
25. Kight, 325 Ga. App. at 352-57, 750 S.E.2d at 817-20.
26. Id. at 355, 750 S.E.2d at 818.
27. 294 Ga. 477, 754 S.E.2d 358 (2014).
28. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-473(a) (2002 & Supp. 2014) ("The action shall be commenced
against the person liable for the damages or such person's insurer within one year after the
date the liability is finally determined by a settlement, by a release, by a covenant not to
bring an action, or by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.").
29. HospitalAuthority, 294 Ga. at 479, 754 S.E.2d at 360.
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it was filed more than one year after the settlement agreement was
reached, because it was filed less than one year after the date the
release was executed.80
C. UninsuredMotorist Cases
The Georgia Supreme Court answered two certified questions from the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
regarding the 2008 amendments to the Uninsured Motorist Act"' and
an umbrella policy in Wilson v. Automobile Insurance Co.8 2 Wilson
involved a personal umbrella insurance policy originally issued in 2001
and renewed annually thereafter. The insureds did not reject uninsured
motorist (UM) coverage in writing.' Therefore, pursuant to Abrohams
v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Agency,34 UM coverage in an amount
equal to the liability limit would have been implied into the policy.85
However, O.C.G.A. § 33-7-1136 was amended in 2008, effective January
1, 2009, to provide that "[tihe coverage required under [OCGA § 33-711(a)(1)] excludes umbrella or excess liability policies unless affirmatively provided for in such policies or in a policy endorsement."17 The
amendments also included a notice requirement, codified at O.C.G.A.
§ 33-7-11(bX1)(D)(ii)(III), requiring that
[flor private passenger motor vehicle insurance policies in effect on
January 1, 2009, insurers shall send to their insureds who have not
rejected coverage pursuant to [OCGA § 33-7-11(a)(3)] a notice at least
45 days before the first renewal of such policies advising of the
coverage options set forth in this division.'
Wilson was injured in a collision in October 2010. The Wilsons made
a claim against their insurer, who denied that the umbrella policy
provided any UM coverage due to the effect of the 2008 amendment.
The Wilsons brought suit. The trial court certified two questions to the
Georgia Supreme Court, asking whether the offer and rejection
requirements of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 apply to an umbrella policy renewed

30. See id.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
Ga. S.
38.

O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2014).

293 Ga. 251, 744 S.E.2d 732 (2013).
Id. at 251-52, 744 S.E.2d at 733.
282 Ga. App. 176, 638 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
Wilson, 293 Ga. at 252, 744 S.E.2d at 733.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2014).
Wilson, 293 Ga. at 252, 744 S.E.2d at 733 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Bill 276 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2008 Ga. Laws 1192, 1194).
Id. at 254, 744 S.E.2d at 734 (alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-7-

1 l(b)(1)(D)(ii)(III)).
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on or after January 1, 2009, and whether the notice requirements of the
statute apply to umbrella policies. 9 As to the first question, the
supreme court first rejected Wilson's argument that the 2008 amendment was an unconstitutional retroactive impairment of contract
obligations because the amendment only affected policies issued or
renewed after its effective date.4 Next, the court held that nothing
else regarding the amendment to the statute itself would require UM
coverage, which was implied into a policy by operation of law before
January 1, 2009, to continue to be implied upon renewal after the date
of enactment. 41 The court noted, however, that other principles of
statutory or common law might still require that the implied UM
coverage continue.42 On the question regarding the notice requirement
of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(DXii)(III), the court held that it would be
"nonsensical" to require insurers to give notice of the types of UM
coverage available when no such coverage was required or being
offered.'
McGraw v. IDS Property & Casualty Insurance Co." also examined
an insurer's compliance with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11.
McGraw was insured by IDS in a policy originally issued in 2007. The
application for the policy contained no mention of UM coverage at all.
When the policy was issued, the 2007 declarations page showed liability
coverage of $100,000 per person and UM coverage of $50,000 per person.
45
The policy was renewed with the same coverage limits. In December
2008, IDS sent McGraw the statutorily required notice that "reduced"
and "added on" coverage options were available and a form on which the
insured was to indicate his choice.46 The notice stated that if the form
was not returned, the policy would provide added-on coverage "to the

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 252, 744 S.E.2d at 733-34.
Id. at 253-54, 744 S.E.2d at 734.
Id.
Id. The court cited O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45 (2013 & Supp. 2014) as an example.

Wilson, 293 Ga. at 254-54, 744 S.E.2d at 734. That statute requires an insurer renewing
a policy to provide "no less than the coverage contained in the superseded policy" unless

the insurer provides notice of a reason for a modification in coverage. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 33-24-45(b)(2)). The court held that if a policy to which O.C.G.A. § 33-24-45 applied
contained coverage implied by operation of law, that coverage would continue upon renewal
unless the statutory notice was provided. Wilson, 293 Ga. at 254, 744 S.E.2d at 734.
43. Wilson, 293 Ga. at 254-55,744 S.E.2d at 735 (interpreting O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(3)).

44. 323 Ga. App. 408, 744 S.E.2d 891 (2013).
45. Id. at 409, 744 S.E.2d at 892.
46.

Id.
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current limit shown on your renewal declaration page."4 7 The form was
not returned.4"
McGraw and his wife were injured in an accident in June of 2009.
McGraw sued the alleged tortfeasor and served IDS as his UM carrier.
IDS answered in its own name and also counterclaimed for a declaratory
judgment that its coverage was limited to $50,000 per person. The trial
court held that coverage was limited as shown in the declarations.
McGraw appealed, arguing that he was entitled to UM coverage equal
to the liability coverage limit of $100,000 per person because he did not
affirmatively choose the lower coverage amount.49 The court of appeals
agreed with McGraw, holding that automobile insurance policies are
required to provide UM coverage limits equal to the liability limits
unless the insured affirmatively chooses lower UM limits and that the
undisputed evidence did not show any affirmative choice by McGraw of
the $50,000 limit shown in the declarations.50 The court held neither
McGraw's acceptance of the non-conforming policy as originally issued
nor his failure to return the election form in connection with his renewal
after December of 2008 was evidence of an affirmative choice."'
In Leslie v. Doe5 2 and Eells v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,5 the court of appeals focused on the insureds' compliance with the requirements of the UM statute and policy conditions.'
Leslie involved a no-contact, "phantom-vehicle" claim, and the primary
issue on appeal-for the purposes of this Survey-was whether the
purported eyewitness, who had a family connection to the insured
claimant and provided multiple contradictory versions of what he
actually did and did not see, could satisfy the O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(2)
requirement that the claimant's description of how the incident occurred
be corroborated by an eyewitness to the occurrence.55 The court of
appeals held that neither the witness's credibility nor his contradictions
were relevant to whether his testimony corroborated the claimant's
testimony, and therefore, summary judgment to the John Doe defendant
was reversed.5 6

47. Id.
48. Id. at 412, 744 S.E.2d at 894.
49. Id. at 408-09, 744 S.E.2d at 892-93.
50. Id. at 408, 410, 412, 744 S.E.2d at 893, 894.
51. Id. at 411-12, 744 S.E.2d at 894.
52. 326 Ga. App. 154, 756 S.E.2d 238 (2014).
53. 324 Ga. App. 901, 752 S.E.2d 70 (2013).
54. See Leslie, 326 Ga. App. at 154-55, 756 S.E.2d at 239-40; Eells, 324 Ga. App. at 90305, 752 S.E.2d at 72-73.
55. Leslie, 326 Ga. App. at 154, 156, 756 S.E.2d at 239-40.
56. Id. at 154, 158, 756 S.E.2d at 239, 242.

100

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

In Eells, the injured plaintiff was a pedestrian who brought suit
against a John Doe, claiming injury from a hit-and-run incident. The
only notice of the incident given to State Farm-except for the notice
given just before suit was filed nearly two years later-was when Eells's
mother mentioned the incident to her State Farm agent during a
telephone call about an unrelated matter. State Farm was served with
the lawsuit and answered in its own name. The company then moved
for summary judgment, arguing the mother's oral notice did not comply
with the policy's requirement for written notice of the incident and the
delay of almost two years in giving written notice was not legally
justified. The trial court granted summary judgment.5"
The court of appeals addressed three arguments made by Eells:
whether compliance with the requirement for written notice was a
condition precedent to coverage; whether actual knowledge based on the
mother's report was sufficient to avoid a bar to coverage; and whether
an ambiguity in the policy or the plaintiff's ignorance of the existence of
coverage for the incident excused his lateness in providing written
notice. 58 The court first held that the requirement of written notice
was a condition precedent to coverage based upon the policy language,
including the condition that "[tihere is no right of action against [State
Farm] ...

until all the terms of this policy have been met."5 9 This

policy language, the court said, was the same as that in its 2010 decision
in Lankford v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.,s and its decision on
the issue followed that in Lankford.61 Next, based on several prior
decisions, the court held that oral notice to the company, and the
company's actual knowledge of the incident, did not excuse the failure
to comply with the policy requirement for written notice.62 The
insured's ignorance that the State Farm policies provided coverage for
this incident was not directly addressed by the court, although the court
did hold "that an insured 'is chargeable with awareness of the insurance
coverage it solicited, and with checking the policy to see that proper
coverage had been obtained.'"6' 8

57. Eells, 324 Ga. App. at 902, 752 S.E.2d at 72.
58. Id. at 903-04, 752 S.E.2d at 72-73.
59. Id. at 903, 752 S.E.2d at 72 (alteration in original) (quoting Lankford v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 Ga. App. 12, 14, 703 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2010)).
60. 307 Ga. App. 12, 703 S.E.2d 436 (2010).
61. Eels, 324 Ga. App. at 903, 752 S.E.2d at 72.
62. Id. at 904, 752 S.E.2d at 73.
63. Id. at 905, 752 S.E.2d at 73 (quoting Atlanta Int'l Props., Inc. v. Ga. Underwriting
Ass'n, 149 Ga. App. 701, 702, 256 S.E.2d 472, 473 (1979)).
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However, the court agreed with Eells that the policy was possibly
ambiguous regarding its reporting requirement." The problematic
terms of the policy were found in the coverage section, which defined an
uninsured motor vehicle to include a hit-and-run vehicle that strikes
"the insured or the vehicle the insured is occupying," and the reportingrequirements section, which stated the insured must report the accident
and "let us see the insured car the person occupied in the accident."65
Since the trial court had not considered whether these terms made the
policy ambiguous regarding the requirement for reporting the accident,
the court of appeals did not rule on the question and remanded the case
to the trial court to determine whether an ambiguity existed and
whether any such ambiguity excused the late notice.6"
In Wade v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Co., the court of appeals
addressed another possible ambiguity in a policy and its effect upon UM
coverage. 8 In Wade, the plaintiff alleged that multiple tortfeasors
contributed to causing the accident and his damages. The plaintiff
settled with one of those tortfeasors for his policy limits using a limited
liability release and settled with the other tortfeasors for less than their
policy limits and gave them a general release. After the dismissal from
the lawsuit of the defendants who settled for less than their policy
limits, Wade's UM carrier, Allstate Fire and Casualty Co. (Allstate),
moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no obligation to pay
because Wade failed to exhaust the liability coverage limits of all
tortfeasors who caused his damages. The trial court granted the
motion.69
Allstate's policy contained an exhaustion requirement that limited any
obligation to pay UM benefits "until after the limits of liability for all
liability protection in effect and applicable at the time of the accident
have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements."7" The
term "applicable" was not defined in the policy, and its meaning was the
focus of the parties' arguments.7 1 Wade argued, and the court of
appeals agreed, that because of the O.C.G.A. § 51-12-3372 requirement
that damages be apportioned according to fault, whether he sustained
damages caused by the remaining defendant in excess of his exhausted

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 905-06, 752 S.E.2d at 74.
Id. at 904-05, 752 S.E.2d at 73.
Id. at 905-06, 752 S.E.2d at 74.
324 Ga. App. 491, 751 S.E.2d 153 (2013).
Id. at 491, 751 S.E.2d at 154-55.
Id. at 492, 751 S.E.2d at 155.
Id. at 493, 751 S.E.2d at 156.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2000 & Supp. 2014).
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liability policy limits could not be determined until the total damages
7
had been determined and apportioned to each tortfeasor. " Because
that tortfeasor's policy was the only applicable policy pertaining to him,
and the settlement had exhausted it, the court disagreed with Allstate's
argument that the exhaustion requirement of all applicable policies
meant it had no duty to pay UM benefits for additional damages caused
by that tortfeasor if there were other tortfeasors whose policy limits had
not been exhausted. 4
III.

NoN-AuTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Bad Faith
Georgia courts continue to emphasize the potential risks to insurers
who decide to deny a duty to defend their insureds and who fail to settle
a case for policy limits when liability is clear. In Khan v. Landmark
American Insurance Co., 75 Khan filed suit against the insured nightclub, alleging he was shot by, or at the direction of, an employee of the
76
nightclub while in the course and scope of the nightclub's business.
The insurance policy excluded bodily injury claims arising from an
assault or battery unless committed by the insured's employee while
trying to "protect persons and/or property."77 After the insurer refused
to defend the nightclub because the injury was not covered, Khan
obtained a default judgment against the nightclub, obtained an
assignment of the nightclub's claims against the insurer for failure to
defend and provide coverage, and sued the insurer.7"
The court of appeals held that the default judgment conclusively
established that the shooter was the nightclub's employee, but the
default judgment did not establish the specific identity of the shooter or
whether the shooter was trying to protect persons, property, or both.79
Therefore, the insurer was entitled to contest those factual issues as they
applied to the question of coverage and did not waive the issues by
failing to provide a defense.80 However, the court further held that
Khan's damages for the insurer's breach of the duty to defend were not
capped at the policy limits; instead, consequential damages flowing from
A.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Wade, 324 Ga. App. at 495, 751 S.E.2d at 157.
Id. at 494-96, 751 S.E.2d at 156-58.
326 Ga. App. 539, 757 S.E.2d 151 (2014).
Id. at 540, 757 S.E.2d at 153.
Id.

78. Id.
79. Id at 542-43, 757 S.E.2d at 154-55.
80. Id. at 542-43, 757 S.E.2d at 155.
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an insurer's breach of the duty to defend are a matter for jury determination."1 In a special concurrence, Judge Michael P. Boggs wrote that
Khan would not automatically be entitled to damages in excess of policy
limits; rather, Khan would only be entitled to those damages directly
traceable to the insurer's breach of its duty to defend. 2
In Camacho v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,' the insured
caused an automobile accident that resulted in the death of Camacho.
Soon after the insurer received notice of the claim, and before the suit
was filed, the insurer determined that adverse liability against its
insured was probable, and the value of the claim exceeded the policy
limits of $100,000. Camacho's attorney sent the insurer a demand letter
stating that his client would settle all claims, including Camacho's claim
for wrongful death and Camacho's estate's claim for special damages, in
exchange for the policy limits, but that his client would sign only a
limited release. The letter indicated that the demand would remain
open for ten days. Ten days after receiving the letter, the insurer
responded that it would pay the limits, conditioned upon the execution
of a general release and receipt of further information regarding the
status of the estate. After the ten-day deadline expired, the insured
indicated to the insurer that he would accept a limited liability release,
and the insurer advised Camacho's attorney accordingly. Camacho then
filed suit against the insured, a judgment was entered against the
insured for $5.83 million, and the insured assigned his claims against
the insurer to Camacho. 4
The insurer sought summary judgment in the subsequent action
brought by Camacho. First, the insurer argued that it was entitled to
the protection of the "safe harbor" doctrine because it attempted to settle
the case for limits before receipt of the demand letter, and because
Camacho's attorney would only accept a limited release and did not
address how outstanding medical bills and funeral expenses would be
handled.' In rejecting that argument, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia indicated that the safe harbor
protection applies to two scenarios: (1) where a settlement demand
requires a condition beyond the insurer's control, and (2) where a
potential dilemma exists between conflicting statutory and common law
duties.8 " The first scenario did not apply because the condition of

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 543-45, 757 S.E.2d at 155-56.
Id. at 545-46, 757 S.E.2d at 156, 157 (Boggs, J., concurring specially).
13 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
Id. at 1350-51, 1352-54.
Id. at 1348-49, 1355.
Id. at 1356.
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providing a limited release was within the insurer's control.87 The
second scenario did not apply because there was no evidence that the
sole reason the settlement was not reached was Camacho's refusal to
assure satisfaction of any medical liens and expenses."
Second, the court rejected the insurer's argument that the demand was
legally incapable of acceptance because the demand did not clearly
articulate that the settlement would apply to all claims.8 9
Third, the insurer argued that the ten-day time limit was unreasonably short under the circumstances and prevented the insurer from
accomplishing the settlement. 0 In rejecting the argument, the court
noted that the insurer was aware the case required settlement in the
amount of the policy limits and that Camacho would insist on a limited
release long before the demand was made.91 Moreover, it noted the
insurer's rejection of the demand was not based upon lack of information, but upon its objection to the condition of a limited release, and the
insurer delayed well past the ten-day deadline before refusing the
demand.9 2
Finally, the court rejected the insurer's argument that it was putting
the best interest of the insured ahead of its own interest by insisting
that the settlement include a general release.93 The court stated that
"a reasonable jury could find that waiting until the last possible day
before the policy-limits demand expired... to begin inquiries regarding
a Limited Release, which Nationwide's insured ultimately agreed to do
without, was in bad faith."94
While the court denied the insurer's motion for summary judgment on
the bad-faith failure to settle the claim, it did grant summary judgment
on the plaintiff's tort claim-that the insurer failed to handle Camacho's
claim with ordinary care-because improper claims handling is a matter
of contract, not tort.95

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1356-57.
89. Id. at 1357, 1360.
90. Id. at 1360-61.
91. Id. at 1361.
92. Id. Note that if this case had fallen under the new statute addressing time-limit
demands for policy limits, O.C.GA § 9-11-67.1 (2014), the time frame for the insurer to
respond would have been thirty days from receipt of the demand, not ten days, and the
insurer would have had the right to seek clarification of "terms, liens, subrogation claims,
standing to release claims, medical bills, medical records, and other relevant facts."
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1(d).
93. Camacho, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 1361-62.
94. Id. at 1362.
95. Id. at 1362, 1364.
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B. Misrepresentationin Application and Classification of Business
Activities
Decisions during the survey period reinforced the importance of
insureds fully disclosing all types of business activities in which they are
involved when applying for a business insurance policy. In Sentinel
Insurance Co. v. Action Stop, LLC,9" the insured "was an internet cafd
that sold prepaid telephone calling cards, cellular phone accessories,
office products and services, and internet time. 9 7 When the insured
applied for businessowners' policies, an underwriter for the insurer
asked the insured's agent whether the insured offered any type of
"sweepstakes" games as part of its business, to which the agent replied
the insured did not.9
After the insured submitted claims for two
burglaries, the insurer's investigation revealed that the insured's
business did include offering its customers sweepstakes games.
According to the underwriter, if the insured told the insurer that it
offered sweepstakes games, the insurer would not have issued the
policies. In its action seeking to rescind the policies for misrepresentations made by the insured in its application for insurance, the insurer
sought summary judgment based upon the insured's misrepresentation
of the nature of its business.99
In granting summary judgment, the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia concluded that the insured made the
alleged misrepresentation and that the insured's good faith intentions
were irrelevant.0 0 Moreover, the court held that the misrepresentation was material because it was undisputed that the insurer would not
have issued the policies pursuant to its underwriting guidelines if it had
been aware
that the insured was involved in offering sweepstakes
0
games.' '
In Britt UW, Ltd. v. Hallister Property Development, LLC, 02 the

insurer took a different approach to the issue, filing a declaratory

96. 958 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.D. Ga. 2013).
97. Id. at 1373.
98. Id. at 1375.
99. Id. at 1373-76.
100. Id. at 1378-79 (relying upon O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7(b)(2) to (3) (2013)); see also Allied
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01265, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42977, at *15 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014) (noting Georgia courts do not distinguish
between misrepresentations and omissions under the statute; therefore, if the insured
provided correct information while omitting material facts, the policy still could be subject
to rescission).
101. Sentinel Insurance Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
102. 6 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
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judgment action to have the court declare it had no duty to defend or
indemnify the insured for an injury that arose out of business activities
103
not listed in the classifications of activities set forth in the policy.
The Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy contained a "Classification Limitation Endorsement" that limited coverage to operations
described in the insured's business classifications,. which were set forth
in the "Declarations" of the policy.' ° The Declarations classified the
insured's business as "Contractors-Executive Supervisors Or Executive
Superintendents Including Products/Completed Operations" and
"Contractors-Subcontracted Work-In Connection With Building
Construction, Reconstruction, Repair Or Erection-One Or Two Family
Dwellings."0 5
The insured was sued by an individual who suffered injuries when he
6 The complaint
was thrown from a horse on the insured's property.

alleged that the insured's facilities "were not adequately equipped to
handle horses or horse riding."" 7 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia held that the policy's classifications of
the insured's business activities were not ambiguous, the policy did not
cover the type of activity in which the insured was involved when the
injury occurred, and the insurer was entitled to the declaratory
judgment it sought.'
An insurer, on the other hand, cannot be held liable to an injured
person for inspections the insurer performs of the insured's business
solely for underwriting purposes." 9 In Manker v.Zurich Services
Corp.,110 Zurich performed yearly property-risk assessments for
underwriting purposes at the insured's sugar refinery plant. An
explosion at the plant injured the plaintiffs. The condition that caused
the explosion at the plant existed when Zurich performed one of its risk
assessments."'

Pursuant to § 324A of the Restatement (Second) of

2

Torts," the plaintiff sought to hold Zurich negligent for failing to
identify the condition that caused the explosion."' Because Zurich did

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1324.
Id. (capitalization altered).
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1327, 1328.
Manker v. Zurich Servs. Corp., 556 F. App'x 907, 907-08 (11th Cir. 2014).
556 F. App'x 907 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 908.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 324A (1965).
Manker, 556 F. App'x at 908. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 324A, states:
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not perform the inspection for its insured, but did so for its own
insurance underwriting purposes, it was entitled to summary judgment
on the plaintiff's negligent-inspection claim." 4
C.

I meliness of DeclaratoryJudgment Action

In Sims v. First Acceptance Insurance Co.,115 the insurer filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no duty to
defend the insured. The action was filed more than two years after the
insurer provided a defense to the insured and after the underlying
lawsuit had been placed on a trial calendar. 8 Because the insured
did not object to the defense provided by the insurer under a reservation
of rights, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the passage of time and
the status of the underlying suit against the insured were irrelevant to
the insurer's ability to challenge coverage." 7 The declaratory judgment action was not untimely because the insurer "was not required to
file a declaratory judgment action within any particulartime period, or
at all, to avoid estoppel."" 8
D.

Reservation of Rights

In World Harvest Church, Inc. v. GuideOne Mutual Insurance Co."9
and Hoover v. Maxum Indemnity Co., 20 the Georgia Supreme Court
explained what was required in an insurer's reservation of rights to its

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking,
if(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b)
he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c)
the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A.
114. Manker, 556 F. App'x at 908-09.
115. 322 Ga. App. 361, 745 S.E.2d 306 (2013).
116. Id. at 361-63, 745 S.E.2d at 308-09.
117. Id. at 363, 745 S.E.2d at 309.
118. Id. (quoting Boatright v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 304 Ga. App. 119, 124, 695 S.E.2d
408, 413 (2010)).
119. 287 Ga. 149, 695 S.E.2d 6 (2010). For a discussion of the decision in World
Harvest, see Stephen L. Cotter, et al., Insurance,, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 62
MERCER L. REV. 139, 162-64 (2010).
120. 291 Ga. 402, 730 S.E.2d 413 (2012). For a discussion of Hoover, see Bradley S.
Wolff, et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 64 MERCER L. REV. 151,159 (2012).
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insured to preserve its coverage defenses and not waive them.'2 '
During the survey period, Georgia courts sought to further refine what
constitutes a proper reservation of rights letter issued by the insurer.
In Wellons, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co.,122 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the specificity
123
required under Georgia law for a reservation of rights to be effective.
The court concluded that "a reservation of rights need not specify each
and every potential basis for contesting coverage, as long as the
reservation fairly informs the insured that, notwithstanding the defense
of the insured, the insurer does not waive its coverage defenses." 24
The court interpreted World Harvest "to require the insure[r] to fairly
inform the insured that it is defending under a reservation of rights, but
to only recommend that the insurer provide the specific basis for the
reservation."125 In relying on other Georgia authority to support its
conclusion, the court stated that one reason for its ruling "is that the
insurer may not know of certain coverage defenses until discovery has
126
been completed and the insurer has completed its investigation."
The court upheld as valid the reservation of rights that was the subject
of its decision because, among other things, the letters contained nonwaiver clauses that reserved the insurer's rights to assert additional
coverage defenses that may become known in the future to which the
insured did not object. 27 Hoover did not apply to the reservation-ofrights letters because the insurer did not deny the claim outright and
the right to assert a different coverage defense in the
seek to reserve
8
future. 12
In Canal Indemnity Co. v. Bradley, 29 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia reached a similar conclusion,
upholding a reservation of rights where the insurer did not list each and

121. Hoover, 291 Ga, at 403, 730 S.E.2d at 415; World Harvest, 287 Ga. at 151, 695
S.E.2d at 9.
122. 566 F. App'x 813 (11th Cir. 2014).
123. Id. at 814.
124. Id. at 821.
125. Id. at 821-22.
126. Id. at 822.
127. Id. at 823-24.
128. Id. at 825. As an aside, the court also concluded that the insured's one-year delay
in providing notice of the claim to the insurer who issued the umbrella policy was
untimely, even though this same insurer who issued the umbrella policy also issued the
primary CGL policy, and the insurer did receive timely notice of the claim under the CGL
policy. Id. at 826.
129. No. 1:12-CV-2206-WSD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41691 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2014).
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every basis for contesting coverage, and the insured did not object to the
reservation of rights.3 0
However, in Builders Insurance v. Tenenbaum,' the Georgia Court
of Appeals cautioned insurers that they must reserve coverage defenses
of which they are aware or they will waive such defenses: "Although an
insurer is not required to list each and every basis for contesting
coverage in its initial reservation-of-rights letter in order to preserve its
right to later assert a particular ground for noncoverage, it must act
reasonably promptly upon learning of a policy defense."' 32 The insurer
in that case was aware of the late-notice defense when it issued its
initial reservation of rights, but it did not include the defense in the
letter; therefore, the court held that the insurer waived the defense. 33
E. Additional-InsuredCoverage
In Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Bed Bath & Beyond,
Inc.,"34
' Bed Bath & Beyond was an additional insured under several
CGL policies. Both the named insured on the policies and Bed Bath &
Beyond were sued by numerous consumers who were injured by a
product supplied by the named insured and sold to consumers by Bed
Bath & Beyond. A settlement agreement was entered between the
insurers and the named insured's bankruptcy trustee. Under the
settlement, the insurers agreed to pay $15.1 million to claimants of the
named insured, thereby exhausting the limits of the policies. The
insurers filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that
their duty to defend Bed Bath & Beyond ended because they had
exhausted their policies' limits. 3
The United States District Court for the Nothern District of Georgia
concluded that the policies unambiguously stated that the insurers' duty
to defend the insureds under their policies ended when the insurers
exhausted the applicable limits by the payment of claims.' 36 The
policies contained no language requiring the insurers to consider
whether settlement would leave the additional insured without
coverage.' 3 7 While "'an additional insured is entitled to the same
protection as a named insured,' an additional insured is not entitled to

130. Id. at *15-19.
131.

327 Ga. App. 204, 757 S.E.2d 669 (2014).

132. Id. at 210, 757 S.E.2d at 675 (footnote omitted).
133. Id. at 210-11, 757 S.E.2d at 675-76.
134. No. 1:12-CV-01265-RWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42977 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2014).

135. Id. at *2-3, *6-8.
136. Id. at *24-25.
137. Id. at *24.
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38 The court
additional rights under an insurance contract, either."'
held that this interpretation was consistent with Georgia law addressing
claimants for whom policy limits had been exhausted: "[A] liability
insurer may, in good faith and without notification to others, settle part
of multiple claims against its insured even though such settlements
deplete or exhaust the policy limits so that remaining claimants have no
recourse against [the] insurer."'39 Therefore, the court declared that
the insurer's payment of their policies' limits terminated their duty to
defend Bed Bath & Beyond. 4 °

Occurrence in Construction Defect Cases
As discussed in several previous Annual Survey of Georgia Law
articles, Georgia state and federal courts have been seeking to clarify
whether claims of faulty workmanship that cause damage only to the
insured's work itself are covered under the definition of "occurrence" in
a CGL policy."' This past year, the Georgia Supreme Court conclusively addressed the issue in Taylor Morrison Services, Inc. v. HDIGerling America Insurance Co. 14 2 in response to certified questions
43

F

Eleventh
from the United States Court of Appeals for the

Circuit.

In Taylor Morrison Services, Inc., the insured was sued by homeowners who alleged the concrete foundations of their houses were improperly
constructed. The insurer, who issued a standard CGL policy to the
insured, brought a declaratory judgment action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia seeking a declaration
that its policy did not provide coverage for the claims.'" The district
court found no coverage under the policy for several reasons, including
that the claims did not constitute an occurrence because the only alleged

138. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins.
Co., No. l:06-CV-2074-JOF, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23663, at *23 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23,2009)).
139. Id. at *25 (second alteration in original) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Evans, 200
Ga. App. 713, 714, 409 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1991)).

140. Id. at *29.
141. See Dean A. Calloway, Insurance,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L.

REV. 135, 136 (2012); Stephen L. Cotter, et al., Insurance, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
Insurance,Annual Survey
62 MERCER L. REV. 139, 164-66 (2010); Stephen L. Cotter, et al.,

of Georgia Law, 60 MERCER L. REV. 191, 194-96 (2008); Stephen M. Schatz, et al.,
Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 165, 167-70 (2011); Stephen
M. Schatz, et al., Insurance,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 57 MERCER L. REV. 221, 23033 (2005); Stephen M. Schatz, et al., Insurance,Annual Survey ofGeorgia Law, 56 MERCER

L. REV. 253, 260-62 (2004).
142. 293 Ga. 456, 746 S.E.2d 587 (2013).
143. Id. at 456, 746 S.E.2d at 588.
144.

Id. at 457-58, 746 S.E.2d at 588-89.
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"property damage" was to the work of the insured, and the insured
appealed.145
Relying on American Empire SurplusLines Insurance Co. v. Hathaway
Development Co.,146 the supreme court interpreted the term "accident,"
which is used in the definition of occurrence, to most commonly mean
"an unexpected happening without intention or design." 47 Because
accident is not commonly used to convey information regarding the
nature or extent of the injuries caused by an accident, or regarding the
identity of the person whose interests are injured, the court concluded
that "'occurrence,' as the term is used in a standard CGL policy, does not
require damage to the property or work of someone other than the
insured."14 The court acknowledged that claims similar to those
asserted against the insured still may not be covered under a standard
CGL policy because they may not qualify as property damage, are
excluded by the "business risk" exclusions, or both; however, the
definition of occurrence is not a basis to limit coverage for such
claims. 149 The court stated, 'The sounder analytical approach is to
avoid conflating the several requirements of the insuring agreement and
the exclusions, and instead, to let each serve its proper purpose. " "o
The court also held that breach of warranty claims constitute an
occurrence.'' "It is substance, not a label that matters." 52 However, fraud claims, by their very nature, do not involve an accident, and
therefore do not constitute an occurrence. 153
G.

IntentionalAct Exclusion
In Goodwin v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"" Allstate's clear policy
language allowed it to avoid unintended coverage for a violent death. 5
In Goodwin, the homeowner, Johnson, shot and killed his wife while
145. Id. at 458, 746 S.E.2d at 589.

146. 288 Ga. 749, 707 S.E.2d 369 (2011). For an analysis of the American Empire
decision, see Stephen M. Schatz, et al., Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63
MERCER L. REV. 165, 167-70 (2011).

147. Taylor Morrison Services, Inc., 293 Ga. at 459, 460, 746 S.E.2d at 590, 591

(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 15 (6th ed. 1990)).

148. Id. at 460, 746 S.E.2d at 591.
149. Id. at 457, 461-63, 746 S.E.2d at 588, 591-92.
150. Id. at 463, 746 S.E.2d at 592.
151. Id. at 466-67, 746 S.E.2d at 595.
152. Id. at 466, 746 S.E.2d at 595.
153. Id. at 465-66, 746 S.E.2d at 594. After TaylorMorrisonServices, Inc. was decided,
the court of appeals followed the same rationale in Builders. Builders, 327 Ga. App. at 208,
757 S.E.2d at 674.
154. 326 Ga. App. 446, 756 S.E.2d 674 (2014).

155. Id. at 446, 756 S.E.2d at 675.
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insured by an Allstate policy that excluded "any bodily injury or property
damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from
5
the intentional or criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person." '
This language differs from the typical intentional-act exclusion, which
the Georgia Supreme Court has held does not apply where the insured
lacks the capacity to intend his acts. 157 A jury question regarding
capacity would have been presented here, but for Allstate's "lack-of-capacity" clause that provided, "[T]his exclusion applies even if: a) Such
insured person lacks the mental capacity to govern his or her con5
" Facing the usual litany of interpretation arguments in favor
duct.""
of insureds under contracts of adhesion, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the clause was unambiguous and that it was proper to rule, as
a matter of law, on these facts using "an objective, reasonable person"
standard.159 This holding adds to Allstate's string of victories, which
6°
were all founded on consistently clear policy language.
H.

Appraisal

In Lam v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 6 ' a divided court of appeals joined
Tennessee and other states 6 2 in holding that an appraisal clause can
only be used to resolve a disputed issue of value and not a dispute over
the extent of coverage.' 63 Allstate accepted homeowner Lam's windloss claim for wind damage to four shingles and ensuing interior
damages, but Lam wanted the entire roof replaced and demanded an
The court held that the extent of a
appraisal of the entire roof.'
65
On this matter, the
covered loss is not a matter addressing value.'

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 447, 756 S.E.2d at 676.
Roe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 259 Ga. 42, 42, 376 S.E.2d 876, 877 (1989).
Goodwin, 326 Ga. App. at 447, 756 S.E.2d at 676.
Id. at 449, 756 S.E.2d at 677.

160. See Sauls v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 326 Ga. App. 821, 825-26, 757 S.E.2d
455, 459 (2014) (enforcing an expansive "arising out of'exclusion); Mason v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 298 Ga. App. 308, 311, 314, 680 S.E.2d 168, 171, 173 (2009) (applying an undefined
"in connection with the residence premises" term); Espanol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Ga.
App. 336, 339-40, 601 S.E.2d 821, 824 (2004) (enforcing an intentional injury exclusion
because of policy language dealing with lack of capacity).
161. 327 Ga. App. 151, 755 S.E.2d 544 (2014).
162. See, e.g., Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Batts, 59 S.W.3d 142 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001); San Souci Apartments v. Natl Sur. Corp., No. CV-12-2389-PHX-GMS, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14616 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2013).
163. Lam, 327 Ga. App. at 153-54, 755 S.E.2d at 546.
164. Id. at 152, 755 S.E.2d at 545.
165. Id. at 154, 755 S.E.2d at 546.
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dissent sided with other
states, which hold appraisal reaches both price
166
and extent of a loss.
I.

Insurance Agency Issues
In Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. T & G Enterprises,
Inc.,'6 7 a question of fact was resolved regarding what were "the usual
terms of the policy" to be issued under a binder. 68 T & G Enterprises,
Inc. was in the rental property business, and thus had a number of
insurance policies with Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
(Georgia Farm Bureau). It purchased a new property and obtained a
property insurance binder. A week later, a significant property loss
occurred and coverage was denied.169 The court of appeals reasoned
that binders "shall be deemed to include all the usual terms of the policy." 170 Hence, the court sifted through the evidence, pro and con,
regarding the usual terms as applied to this situation. The carrier
advanced that both the basic and broad forms of coverage excluded such
a loss. The insured countered that the binder specified neither form of
coverage and that the policies did provide coverage on properties
previously insured by Georgia Farm Bureau."' The court concluded
that the well-developed factual record was a sufficient basis to require
a jury to decide what the "usual terms of the policy" really were. 172
In MLR Investment Group, LLC v. Pate Insurance Agency, Inc.,1 71
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
clearly set forth the applicable test defining when an insured can rely
upon an insurer's agent to properly procure coverage."' Here, a
captive (exclusive) State Farm agent allegedly failed to procure
appropriate insurance on the plaintiff's now-rented property. A loss
occurred for which State Farm denied coverage. 175 The court held,
with respect to a captive agent, that "[a]bsent actionable fraud and
deceit," there is no liability in tort for the insurer's insurance agent

166. Id. at 156, 755 S.E.2d at 548 (McFadden, J., dissenting); see also State Farm
Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 887 (Tex. 2009); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Licea,
685 So. 2d 1285, 1288 (Fla. 1996).
167. 324 Ga. App. 445, 751 S.E.2d 99 (2013).
168. Id. at 449, 751 S.E.2d at 102.
169. Id. at 446, 751 S.E.2d at 100.
170. Id. at 446-47, 751 S.E.2d at 100-01 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 33-24-33 (2013)).
171. See id. at 447-48, 751 S.E.2d at 101-02.
172. Id. at 449, 751 S.E.2d at 102.
173. No. 7:12-CV-118 (HL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146512 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2013).
174. Id. at *5.
175. Id. at *1, *3, *5.

114

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

failing to properly procure coverage.' 76 Mere negligence is an insuffi77
Addicient basis of liability regarding a captive insurance agent.'
one
as
such
claim,
procurement
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precluded
court
the
tionally,
7
has
insured
the
'
Here,
agent.
a
dual
against
that could be advanced
by
is
bound
and
policy
its
examine
and
read
to
an affirmative obligation
in
expert
an
to
be
out
himself
held
agent
the
the policy's terms unless
agent
of
the
expertise
the
on
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the area, and the insured reasonably
in procuring the correct insurance.' 79 As applied to the facts here, the
insured knew what type of coverage was desired, and hence, it could not
be said that the insured reasonably relied upon the agent's expertise.' Unlike co-insurance clauses and other policy terms containing
insurance nuances, the basis of non-coverage here was readily apparent. 18 '
FinancialInstitution Related Issues
In St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Miller,"2 the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was unsuccessful in avoiding the
particular terms of St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. (St. Paul)'s "Insured
v. Insured" exclusion because the exclusion applied to claims brought "on
behalf of' an insured by the FDIC."s Community Bank & Trust of
Cornelia (CB&T) purchased Directors & Officers Liability (D&O)
insurance from St. Paul. When the FDIC took over CB&T as receiver,
it sued several former employees for improperly approving loans that
defaulted.li 4 St. Paul initiated a declaratory judgment action claiming
that the terms of its insurance policy were unambiguous and that its
or
"Insured v. Insured" exclusion barred coverage for claims "brought
185
maintained by or on behalf of any Insured... in any capacity."
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
first determined that "the Insured v. Insured exclusion [was] not
ambiguous" as applied because the United States Supreme Court has
held that "the FDIC as receiver steps into the shoes of the failed
J.

[financial institution] ... obtaining the rights of the insured depository

176. Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v.Pate, 193 Ga. App. 418,418,
388 S.E.2d 30, 31 (1989)).
177. Id. at *8.
178. Id. at *8-9.
179. Id. at *9.
180. Id. at *9-10.
181. See id.
182. 968 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
183. Id. at 1240, 1244.
184. Id. at 1238.
185. Id. at 1237-38, 1240 (alteration in original) (quoting the exclusion provision).
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institution that existed prior to receivership."" 6 This decision is in
line with the minority view that the FDIC, as a receiver for a failed
bank, is barred from coverage by the "Insured v. Insured" exclusion
because it is acting with the "rights, titles, powers and privileges" of the
bank.3 7 The district court pointed out that the FDIC's claimed
"majority view " "' on this point involved policy language of exclusions
that were quite different, none of which applied to claims brought "on
behalf of" an insured. 8 9 In the same vein as the United States
Supreme Court's decision, the district court rejected the FDIC's public
policy argument, commenting that "this Court disagrees with the notion
that it is acceptable to rewrite a contract between private parties in the
name of saving the taxpaying public money"' 9
In FDIC v. Cincinnati Insurance Cos.,'
the FDIC was again
rebuffed in an attempt to collect on a bank insurance bond, this time by
extreme facts that warranted a carrier's denial of coverage for a forgery
loss.'9 2 The Neighborhood Community Bank (NCB) was taken over by
the FDIC, which sought to collect a seven-figure loan loss due to
forgery. 9' In an extended discussion of the facts, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found the forged sales
contract was accepted despite a "veritable sea of red flags," which was
sufficient to disprove that the loss was "in good faith and in the usual
course of business," an express requirement of the insurance agree94
ment. 1

186. Id. at 1242 (alteration in original) (quoting O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S.
79, 86 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Federal Sav.& Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp. 469,482 (C.D.
Cal. 1987) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 547.7 (1987)); see also Powell v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading,
Pa., 772 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (W.D. Okla. 1991).

188. The majority view is that an "Insured v. Insured" exclusion does not prevent the
FDIC from suing the bank's officers and directors as a receiver. Davis v. BancInsure, Inc.,
No. 3:12-CV-113-TCB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46249, at *26-27 (N.D. Ga. 2013). The
majority maintains that the FDIC has not stepped into the shoes of the bank, and thus,
is not considered an insured. American Cas. Co. v. FDIC, 791 F. Supp. 276, 277 (1992).
This point of view is grounded in three main doctrines: ambiguities in the insurance
contract, the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage, and the unconscionability of a
finding of no coverage. Davis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46249, at *26.
189. Miller, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 1243.
190. Id. Quoting O'Melveny, the district court stated, "IT]here is no federal policy that
the [federal deposit insurance] Fund should always win." Id. at 1242 (quoting O'Melveny,
512 U.S. at 88).
191. 981 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2013).
192. Id. at 1326, 1327-28, and 1345.
193. Id. at 1326.
194. Id. at 1335, 1337.
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The court applied Georgia law because there was no reason to create
federal common law to deal with the present situation.19 The court
rejected Cincinnati Insurance Companies' claim that the loss must result
directly from forgery, concluding it need only be "by reason of" the
forgery, as was the case here.196 The loss is only covered if the insured
"[has] in
good faith and in the usual course of business... extended any
197
credit."

Following precedent from the old United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit that held ordinary negligence is insufficient to convert
good faith to bad faith, the district court considered, in-depth, the extent
of extreme irregularities in the loan that NCB ignored and failed to
investigate before the effective date of the bond, which was found not to
cover the loss.9 8 The court also held that another provision (Exclusion
H) excluded coverage as a "loss caused by an Employee" because the
closing attorney caused the loss.199 Here, the court struggled because
it lacked controlling precedent, and it ultimately concluded that the
undefined causation standard was ambiguous. 00 Coverage is excluded
"only if an employee acts with knowledge of or intent to further a
forgery, or intentionally disregards relevant bank policies."2 ' Under
this "heightened standard of causation," the closing attorney's conduct-falsifying settlement statements and then improperly disbursing
the funds-was so extreme in disregarding NCB policy that Exclusion
H (for any "loss caused by an Employee") was applicable, thereby
precluding coverage.' °2
In non-FDIC related litigation, carriers advanced further winning
positions. In Fidelity Bank v. Chartis Specialty Insurance Co.,203 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
enforced an exclusion with respect to illegal fees that Fidelity Bank
charged customers for overdrafts.2 '
The specific exclusion in the
policy was for any loss arising out of any dispute involving fees, such as
overdraft fees claimed in the class action.205 Although no Georgia
precedent was squarely applicable, the court found abundant persuasive

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1335.
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting the insurance agreement).
Id. at 1336-39.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1344.
Id.
Id. at 1342, 1344.
No. 1:12-CV-4259-RWS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110935 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2013).
Id. at *1-2, *4, *11.
Id. at *4.
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precedent that does not require a carrier to pay restitution to the bank
for the bank's ill-gotten gain in the form of illegal fees because that
would allow the bank to keep its ill-gotten gains that it had no right to
retain.0 6 This holding is consistent with other expressions of the
Georgia policy that wrongdoers cannot benefit from lies or their own
wrongs.0 7
The courts clarified three other areas of financial institution insurance
issues. In Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Insurance
Co.,208 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia enforced the carrier's refusal to pay a settlement for which the
insured had not sought or obtained the defendant's consent." 9 The
court agreed with XL Specialty Insurance Co. that the Georgia Supreme
Court's decision in Trinity Outdoor LLC v. Central Mutual Insurance
Co. 21" barred the claim; even if the carrier unreasonably withholds
consent to a settlement agreement, the amount of the loss must be fixed
by the result in an "actual trial," which did not occur in the matter sub
judice.211 A settlement, regardless of reasons advanced to justify it, is
a voluntary act without an "actual trial."212
In an en banc consideration of a seemingly ambiguous title-insurance
policy in Doss & Associates v. First American Title Insurance Co.,213
the majority of a Georgia Court of Appeals panel held that a poorly
drafted policy would not be rewritten by the court to provide a more
sensible approach for what the policy should provide in terms of
payment." 4 The loss was a result of a confusing set of communications that culminated in the insured's relegation to a second-position lien
on a tract when an escrow agreement requiring the first lien was
asserted. The carrier asserted that the insured received title to land
valued in excess of the allegedly wrongful first-position lien, thereby
reducing the policy limit, as allegedly defined by the contract, to less

206. Id. at *8-10.
207. See Mitchell v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1385, 1396-97 (N.D.
Ga. 2007); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1373 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
208. 11 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
209. Id. at 1187, 1193.
210. 285 Ga. 583, 679 S.E.2d 10 (2009).
211. Piedmont Office Realty Trust, 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1190-91.
212. Id. at 1191; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. King Sports, Inc., 827 F. Supp.
2d 1364, 1380-81 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (holding that a settlement was not enforceable against
State Farm because the insureds had entered into a voluntary settlement without State
Farm's consent or knowledge).
213. 325 Ga. App. 448, 754 S.E.2d 85 (2013).
214. Id. at 457-59, 754 S.E.2d at 94-95.
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than zero.2 15 The majority held that the terms of the policy were
nonsensical, and therefore, too vague and uncertain to be enforced.2 1
Section 7(A)(ii) of the policy concerned the liability of the carrier for
the amount of unpaid principal indebtedness, whereas another term of
the policy dealt with the amount of insurance (not liability), and the two
should not be interpreted as dealing with the same subject matter. 1 7
The amount of loss on the tract, on which the insured did not receive a
first lien, was left for later determination and payment under the policy
However, O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6,219 concerning statutory
as written.21
bad faith, was disallowed because while a loss may have occurred at the
time the demand was made, the amount of that loss had not yet been
fixed, and the insured failed to inform the carrier of its foreclosure sale,
necessary to determine the actual monetary loss
which would have been
22 0
covered by the policy.

Finally, in the context of insurance premium finance, the Georgia
Court of Appeals in Burke v. Prime Rate Premium Finance Corp.,221
held that the insured, which financed an insurance premium, could not,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-22-14,222 limit its creditor to the exclusive
remedy of obtaining a refund of unearned premiums from the insurance
company.22 3 Rather,224the creditor had the direct remedy of suing the
insured for the loss.

K. Health Insurance
In America's Health Insurance Plans v. Hudgens,225 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)226 pre-empted
Georgia's Insurance Delivery Enhancement Act (IDEA),227 O.C.G.A.
§§ 33-24-59.5(bXl), -59.5(c),22 which requires self-funded ERISA plans
to promptly pay claims within fifteen days of electronic submission and
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217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 448-51, 754 S.E.2d at 88-90.
Id. at 457, 754 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 454-57, 754 S.E.2d at 92-94.
Id. at 461, 754 S.E.2d at 96.
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (2014).
Doss, 325 Ga. App. at 462-63, 754 S.E.2d at 97-98.
325 Ga. App. 760, 754 S.E.2d 802 (2014).
O.C.GA § 33-22-14 (2014).
Burke, 325 Ga. App. at 762-63, 754 S.E.2d at 803-04.
Id. at 762, 754 S.E.2d at 804.
742 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2014).
29 U.S.C. ch. 18 (2012).
Ga. H.R. Bill 167, Reg. Sess. (2011).
O.C.G.A. §§ 33-24-59.5(b)(1), -59.5(c) (2013).
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within thirty days of paper submission.229 In considering ERISA's
potential preemption, the court made several decisions. " ° First, the
court held that IDEA's attempt to impose a special Georgia timeliness
requirement on claims did "relate to" the self-funded plan because, if
allowed, it would frustrate Congress's clear intent to have a uniform
national scheme; additionally, the court held that the Commissioner's
claim that there was no connection with ERISA because IDEA focused
on non-fiduciary, third-party administrators (TPAs) and medical
providers was a transparent effort to evade ERISA.23 ' The court left
undecided whether the Savings Clause 23 2 applied, acknowledging a
similarity of Georgia's IDEA prompt payment requirements and other
clauses found within the Savings Clause. 2' Rather, the court concluded the Deemer Clause' "exempts self-funded ERISA plans from state
laws that 'regulate insurance,"' such as IDEA.235
In a unanimous opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Spectera, Inc.
v. Wilson,23 affirmed the injunction against enforcing Spectera's
agreement that required its vendors to use Spectera's services and
products.2 37 The vendors successfully claimed that Georgia's Patient
Access to Eye Care Act 238 prohibits an insurer from precluding a
covered person who sought eye care from obtaining that service directly
from a provider on the health-benefit provider panel who is licensed to
furnish eye care.239 Since eye care was defined by the Act as "those
health care services and materials related to the care of the eye," 240
Spectera's agreements illegally precluded the vendors from supplying
lenses other than Spectera lenses. 2 41 While the vendors' contracts
could be terminated by Spectera on a prospective basis, those terminanot the failure to vend 100%
tions have to be founded on lawful terms,
24 2
of eyeglasses from Spectera's stock.

229. Hudgens, 742 F.3d at 1331, 1334.

230. Id. at 1330-34.
231. Id. at 1331.
232. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(bX2)(A) (2012) (exempting state law from preemption if state law
"regulates insurance").
233. Hudgens, 742 F.3d at 1332-34.
234. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2012); see FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52,64 (1990).
235. Hudgens, 742 F.3d at 1333-34 (quoting FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61).
236. 294 Ga. 23, 749 S.E.2d 704 (2013), withdrawn, Spectera, Inc. v. Wilson, No.
$12G1935, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 898 (Ga. Nov. 4, 2013).
237. Wilson, 294 Ga. at 28-29, 749 S.E.2d at 709-10.
238.

O.C.G.A. § 33-24-59.12 (2013).
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240.
241.
242.

Wilson, 294 Ga. at 26-27, 749 S.E.2d at 708-09.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-59.12(b)(3).
Wilson, 294 Ga. at 27, 749 S.E.2d at 708-09.
Id. at 28-29, 749 S.E.2d at 709-10.

